HOKA: How two French alpinists built a $2B running shoe brand

Executive overview

Most running shoe innovation focused on minimalism for decades. Jean-Luc Diard and Nicolas Mermoud went the opposite direction: more foam, a rocker sole, and a foot wrapped inside the cushioning rather than on top of it.

The insight came from a brutal ultra-marathon — legs giving out on a downhill because existing shoes gave no protection. They recognised this as an engineering problem, not a physical limitation.

A shoe designed like a machine — every element serving efficiency — can transform a punishing sport into something that feels like flying.

The Salomon years: background and shared mindset

• Jean-Luc joined Salomon in 1980, eventually became CEO in 1998; grew revenue from ~$75M to $1.2B
• Salomon's culture: close-quarters learning, no hierarchy in problem-solving, constant dissatisfaction as a driver of innovation
• Nico joined from university, first day involved testing ski prototypes on a glacier in the Mont Blanc valley
• Salomon skis went from zero to number-one global sales in six years — both founders internalised what rapid innovation through testing looks like

The insight: oversized beats conventional

• Jean-Luc observed a pattern at the 2007 Outdoor Retailer trade show: in golf, skiing, and cycling, oversized and lighter equipment consistently improved performance and broadened the user base
• TaylorMade club heads grew from 200cc to 460cc — bigger meant more forgiveness and distance
• Fat skis delivered both stability and carving ability simultaneously
• The pattern: oversize + lighter = better performance for more people

The race that defined the problem

• Nico ran the Ultra-Trail du Mont Blanc in 2007 — 101 miles around Mont Blanc; led for 15 hours
• Lost one hour in the final 30K when his quads shut down entirely on the descents
• Downhill running transfers enormous braking force through the quads and knees; no shoe at the time addressed this
• Observation from trail running: certain surfaces — dead leaves, soft lava, snow — felt effortless; hard-packed terrain felt punishing
• Conclusion: the downhill performance collapse was a technology problem, not a fitness problem

Building Hoka from scratch

• Founded ~2008, small design studio in Annecy; bootstrapped with personal funds
• Core concept: rocker sole — shaped like the bottom of a rocking chair to propel the runner forward through the heel-to-toe transition
• Midsole twice as soft (30–35% softer) as industry standard; much larger volume of foam than any existing shoe
• Foot sits inside a bucket-seat-style midsole rather than on top of it — for stability despite the extreme softness
• Supplier challenge: factories had never made foam this soft at this scale; required relationship-based persuasion, not purchase orders
• First wearable prototypes delivered February 2009; within 30 minutes on trail the founders were timing their descents

Race validation and early word of mouth

• Nico raced Chamonix marathon in mid-2009 prototypes — finished fifth in what he described as "clown shoes" that drew stares from the field
• Carl Meltzer (US ultra runner, sponsored by another brand) dropped his sponsor after trying Hokas in neighbourhood runs
• Diane Finkel wore Hokas in the Hardrock 100, led the race overall — including ahead of all male competitors — until mile 90, finished second
• Word spread through ultra-running circles entirely organically; the founders often learned about users after the fact
• Key tactic at trade shows: drop rocks on the ground, have runners test their own shoes on them, then test Hokas — let the product sell itself

Supply chain and cash flow crisis

• Factories allocated only narrow production windows to a tiny, unproven brand
• Each order required expedited shipping at high cost
• Revenue growth created a compounding cash problem: the next order was always twice the size of the previous one
• Banks refused to lend against rapid growth, viewing it as too risky
• Venture funding rejected as a solution: money alone wouldn't fix the supply chain bottleneck or replace the need for people to physically try the shoes

Partnership with Deckers

• Competitors (including Nike) were purchasing Hokas to reverse-engineer them by mid-2010
• Patents provided limited protection — enforcement requires resources a small brand lacks
• Introduction to Deckers in ~2012; Deckers owned Ugg and Teva but had no running brand
• CEO Anil Martinez was personally motivated to enter running — key factor in choosing Deckers over other suitors
• Deckers offered customer service infrastructure, financial backing, legal protection, and no portfolio conflict
• Partnership began with a 20% stake in 2012, stepped up to full acquisition over time
• Deckers prioritised run-specialty retailers first to build credibility before mass-market expansion

Growth and broader impact

• 2012: less than $3M in annual sales; today: over $2B
• Early unexpected demographic: people with chronic joint pain who wanted to remain active
• Strategy for elite athletes: use Hokas for training volume, race in whatever you prefer — reduced training injury became a gateway
• Original ambition was to build a $500M brand; actual scale exceeded all internal projections
• The rocker and oversized-cushion concept has been widely adopted across the industry
• Trail running as a sport has grown significantly; founders credit technology with removing the fear of downhill running that previously limited participation