How bootstrapping a home inspection SaaS led to a $90M exit

Executive overview

Kevin Wagstaff and his brother Mike co-founded Spectora in 2017 with $2,500 each and no outside funding. They identified a stagnant niche — home inspection software — dominated by outdated players, and built a mobile-first SaaS that spread through word of mouth and industry relationships.

By mid-2023, at ~$12M ARR, they sold a 49% stake at a $90M valuation to private equity firm Radian Capital, then sold a further tranche in 2024 at a $110M valuation.

The biggest lever was payments: taking a cut of transactions processed through their platform snowballed from 1% of revenue to 15% as volume grew.

Getting to product-market fit in a quiet niche

• Existing software was outdated — some competitors still shipped on DVDs
• Built mobile-first from day one; inspectors could publish reports from the driveway
• Treated being outsiders as an advantage: "We don't think we know better than you"
• First year: no salaries, answered every support email within one minute
• Drove to trade shows, set up a wrinkled-tablecloth booth, and asked inspectors what they hated about their current software
• Found influential inspectors in private Facebook groups, added value without mentioning the product — anti-sold until curiosity pulled people in
• One 6am Sunday demo with a respected inspector triggered a Facebook group endorsement that kickstarted growth

Growth milestones and what drove them

• End of 2017: ~$18–20K MRR (first year in market)
• End of 2018: $103K MRR (~$1.2M ARR)
• End of 2019: $200K MRR
• End of 2020: $330K MRR
• End of 2021: $600K MRR
• End of 2022: $700K MRR
• End of 2023: ~$800K MRR (~$9.6M ARR)
• Primary growth drivers: word of mouth, SEO, YouTube tutorial content, trade associations, low-cost annual pricing (~$1K/year)

The payments flywheel

• White-labelled Stripe to let inspectors collect payments through Spectora
• Started at ~1% cut of gross merchant volume; improved terms as volume scaled
• Also helped inspectors raise their own prices by adding services — growing the base on which Spectora took a cut
• Payments became a significant share of revenue and a major driver of the acquisition multiple

Navigating early acquisition offers

• 2017: Porch (home services marketplace) offered stock and low six figures — essentially an acqui-hire with a threat to build a competing free product; declined
• 2020: Front Door offered ~$12M; founders passed, confident in continued growth
• 2022: Bay Area PE firm approached without a process; founders ran a full banker-led auction instead
• Key lesson: PE firms approaching founders directly prefer no competitive process because it suppresses price; running a process reveals buyer quality and maximises leverage

The re-trade and why they walked away

• Signed LOI with Bay Area PE at $80M enterprise value in late 2022
• Due diligence ran over the Christmas/New Year period — "abusive"
• Day before wire: received a re-trade lowering effective valuation to ~$70M via earn-out and a call option at a fixed price
• The lead partner believed in the deal; an internal investment committee overruled him
• When the firm reversed and offered the original terms, founders declined — they no longer trusted the relationship
• Lesson: you are entering a multi-year partnership; re-trading is a signal about culture

Meeting Radian and closing the deal

• Met Radian associate Brock at MicroConf Denver — in the men's room
• Radian had seen the business during the earlier process but couldn't meet the price at the time
• Founders were post-PTSD, actively not looking for a deal — which may have helped negotiating position
• April introduction → June final term sheet → August close; no full process required
• Sold just under 50% at $90M valuation; sold a further tranche in 2024 at $110M
• Retained majority control and ~29–30% combined stake post both transactions
• Radian's operating team embedded with the Spectora team to help on go-to-market, product, and payments

Lessons on hiring a banker

• Smaller deals often below banker thresholds; Spectora's size was on the borderline
• Bankers taught how to package the business: the right deck, selling points, future vision — not just historical performance
• Scenario-modelled deal mechanics overnight with banker after the re-trade to understand earn-out and call option implications
• Paid a few percent of deal value; founders view it as a worthwhile investment given deal complexity
• Analogy: "Don't DIY your own LASIK"

Post-exit reflections

• Day the money arrived: refreshed email obsessively, hugged wife, then took out the trash and went to Costco
• Generational wealth felt different from even high annual income — "true optionality"
• After a decompression period, both brothers are now giving back: Kevin as a TinySeed mentor
• Advice to founders talking to PE early: ask directly "what would make this business worth 6–7X?"