Crisis management on the ground: Mercy Corps in Gaza

Executive overview

When Hamas attacked Israel on October 7th, 2023, Mercy Corps had 70 staff and their families inside Gaza. Aid could not get in. Staff could not get out. The organization had to manage a humanitarian response while its own team was trapped in the crisis.

Operational neutrality is not passivity — it is the discipline that keeps aid flowing when taking sides would end it.

Staff safety and communication

• 70 staff plus families, all forced to relocate from northern to southern Gaza
• Daily head count system failed — staff overwhelmed by information requests
• Replaced with two-tier check-in: a simple WhatsApp status ping, then a separate channel for complex coordination
• Regional director pre-emptively relocated from Beirut to Amman to preserve management capacity
• Team phone credits were topped up directly with telecoms to maintain connectivity
• Connection quality declining; leadership preparing for the team to function autonomously

Conditions inside Gaza

• Pre-crisis Gaza: fragile but functional — 2G/3G infrastructure, active agriculture programs, tech-savvy youth seeking remote work
• Post-October 7: unprecedented scale of destruction; no meaningful aid pipeline established in the first weeks
• Small aid convoy that entered created unsafe crowd conditions — described by staff on the ground as "a bandaid"
• Staff members queued at bakeries in areas previously struck by airstrikes; one bakery they visited had been bombed
• Team housing 20+ people per small apartment; some apartments sheltering 50–60 people in 90–100 square metres
• Staff losses: one team member's wife killed, another wounded alongside a child

Running a response when response is impossible

• Core team on the ground focused on securing food, water, and mattresses for other staff — basic survival before any programmatic work
• Mercy Corps sent staff to Egypt to pre-position supply chains and build NGO networks ahead of any border opening
• NGOs largely excluded from early diplomatic negotiations over aid corridors; Mercy Corps pushing for inclusion
• West Bank programs suspended then shifted online; Lebanon programs disrupted by displacement of 20,000+ people from the south
• Lebanon olive harvest season at risk — missed harvest means lost income for displaced farming families

Maintaining neutrality under pressure

• Humanitarian neutrality is operational, not moral — losing perceived impartiality ends access and delivery capacity
• Staff across the region want to speak out and take sides; leadership channels that energy toward the response
• Advocacy organizations take public positions; operational organizations preserve delivery capacity instead
• Discipline to stay neutral requires cutting short conversations when pressed to assign blame
• Personal resilience sustained by team cohesion, not individual practices — no time for exercise or meditation during the crisis

Hardest decisions

• Unable to rescue staff families trapped in basements during the first week despite receiving direct distress messages
• Every public statement carries risk of being associated with one side, potentially ending Mercy Corps' ability to operate
• Emotional support for staff is limited to remote contact and psychological acknowledgement
• Post-conflict reconstruction need will be larger than any previous crisis in the region; years of rebuilding lie ahead